North Korea's Ukraine Battlelab: Knowns and Unknowns
Since Ukraine launched its Kursk 2.0 operation on August 8, the Kremlin has been hard-pressed to oust Ukrainian forces from Russian territory. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, October marked the deadliest month yet in three years of combat in Ukraine, with Russian forces suffering nearly 40,000 casualties. Meanwhile, North Korean President Kim Jong Un has come to Putin’s rescue by dispatching a North Korean expeditionary force of 10,000 men to Russia’s Kursk province.
Kim’s gamble has created tremendous speculation in the West about what the actual North Korean combat role might be in Russia. Key questions concerning their involvement have revolved around what role Kim’s forces would play militarily, such as whether they would be used in an auxiliary support role or actually be directly used by Moscow in the fighting. Whatever decision North Korea might make could certainly usher in a new dimension to Putin’s grinding war of attrition against Ukraine.
That speculation ended in the past several days when the Ukrainian media reported that North Korean military units were involved in recent fighting against Ukrainian forces operating in its Kursk bridgehead. The Kyiv Post published the first videos of a captured North Korean Prisoner of War (POW) speaking in Korean, confirming North Korean combat involvement as the sole survivor of a decimated 40-man unit appeared throughout the Ukrainian national media.
A wounded North Korean soldier discusses the fate of his unit
One of the major known unknowns about the North Korean deployment over the past month was whether the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un would avoid the risk of having his forces participate directly in the fighting which would be a major point of departure from his predecessors. Only two cases exist of North Korean military units being deployed overseas to fight in a major capacity in a major conflict in the country’s entire history. The first instance occurred in the late 1960s during the Vietnam War when North Korean leader Kim Il Sung dispatched 100 North Korean pilots to North Vietnam to serve as fighter pilots from 1965 to 1969, and the second case was in Egypt in 1973.
Deploying 10,000 North Koreans to Europe’s biggest conflict since the end of the Second World War, however, would be a far more riskier move for Kim due to the danger of having captured POWs paraded before Ukrainian and South Korean television that would be a public relations disaster for the North Korean leader. Such a development could severely damage his image and reputation inside the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
According to Thae Yong Ho, a former North Korean diplomat who defected in 2016, Kim took a major gamble by breaking with long-standing North Korean policy to avoid becoming involved in a major overseas conflict and recently told Radio Free Asia that: “I was almost shocked because, during my days in North Korea, I was educated that North Korean soldiers wouldn’t ever fight for the interests of other countries.”
A Fistful of ₩on (조선 원)
Ultimately, what appears to have induced the North Korean leader to take this risk was the multi-million dollar economic payoff offered by President Putin. For each North Korean serviceman sent to Ukraine, Moscow has agreed to pay Pyongyang a monthly fee of $2,000 per month. By North Korean standards, this is a staggering amount, considering that the average salary each North Korean will receive is reportedly only $1.00 a month. The Ukrainian government-run news platform United24 reported that most of this money would “remain with the state.” With an estimated 10,000 North Koreans operating in Kursk alone, this means that Moscow will be paying Pyongyang an estimated $240 million annually in exchange for the North Korean deployment.
Aside from the monetary benefits, two other factors are motivating Kim to assist Putin, according to Thae, the former North Korean diplomat. First, Kim is desperate to gain access to Russian technology. Second, the North Korean leader, “wants to play a role as a game changer in world politics. For instance, when Kim Jong Un has had success with nuclear weapons and ICBMs, he has boasted that North Korea could be a country with strategic importance. But so far, he hasn’t shown to the world that North Korea is a strategically important country.”
Who Will Command the North Koreans?
Given that this is the largest-ever overseas combat deployment in North Korean history, one of the known unknowns is who will command the DPRK expeditionary force while deployed inside Russia. To date, it has been reported that three North Korean generals and about 500 North Korean officers are serving in Russia but no concrete details have emerged about who will coordinate day-to-day military operations with the Kremlin or the Russian General Staff. Russian officials have never overseen such a large allied foreign military force operating before on Russian soil so President Putin is headed into uncharted waters as he balances foreign involvement.
In light of these developments, Kremlin officials face two major challenges in dealing with the North Korean forces. First, Moscow is experiencing a shortage of Korean-speaking officers in the Russian army to direct the operations; and second, Russian officers will have to deal with the issue of North Korean political commissars who serve in each unit and will likely be involved in the day-to-day activities of their military forces operating with, or alongside Russian units.
An apparent answer as to how Russian commanders would interact with North Korean units surfaced recently in the Ukrainian media when it was reported that one Korean-speaking Russian would be assigned to each combat unit of 30 North Koreans. Based upon this report and a recent interview with the sole North Korean survivor of a unit of 40 men in Kursk (where the soldier noted that his North Korean unit was led by a Russian officer who abandoned his unit during its clash with Ukrainian forces), it appears that Russian officers will likely be playing some role in leading the North Korean units in combat. However, the North Korean POW did not specify whether the Russian officer spoke Korean.
Fortunately, the Ukrainian media is emerging as a major source of insight into the North Korean military and its operations inside Russia thanks to the abundance of Ukraine military radio intercepts that are being selectively leaked to the media by government officials in Kyiv. On October 30 Ukrainian ambassador to the U.N., Sergiy Kyslytsya, provided the names of three North Korean generals sent to Russia to fight against Ukraine. Top DPRK officers include two deputy chiefs of the North Korean General Staff: Colonel General Kim Yong Bok, who oversees the North Korean Special Forces XI Corps known as the Storm Corps, and Colonel General Ri Chang Ho, who is in charge of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, North Korea's intelligence agency, according to Kyslytsya. The third North Korean general mentioned is Major General Sin Kum Cheol, the head of the Main Operational Directorate, according to the Ukrainian envoy. Kyslytsya also noted that North Korean troops have been formed into at least five formations of 2,000-3,000 soldiers each, and been integrated into Russian units to conceal their presence.
One of the North Korean generals who arrived in Russia who has created major attention in the Western media is the North Korean Deputy Chief of the General Staff Kim Yong Bok. It is unclear what his role would be in the North Korean command structure during the deployment. As the Deputy Chief of the North Korean General Staff, Bok brings extensive operational experience to the table to oversee North Korean forces operating in Russia because he previously headed the 11th Assault Corps, which serves as the foundation of the North Korean Special Forces. At the same time, by being a close adviser to Kim Jong Un, Bok’s presence in Russia creates an unusual hierarchy of sorts for North Korean forces given that this is the largest overseas military deployment in DPRK history.
Bok, however, is viewed by some Western experts as being too senior to be in command of such a large size force. Kim has appeared at seven events with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un this year, including special forces exercises. Normally, a North Korean contingent of 10,000 men would be led by a Major General, not the Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Such a disparity in the command structure has led some to conclude that North Korean forces operating in Ukraine may not be operating under a traditional command structure and might be completely subjugated to the Russian military leadership. Stimson Center North Korea expert Michael Madden believes Sin would most likely be the person tasked with the responsibility of commanding the North Korean contingent given his one-star status and that may become evident once Kim Yong Bok and Ri Chang Ho return to North Korea.
North Korea’s Ukraine Battlelab
The mystery surrounding Kim Yong Bok’s role in Russia has fueled discussion that one of the reasons he is there is to glean insights from the Ukraine war so that he can return to North Korea and apply a Russian lessons-learned approach to reform the North Korean army. Kim's role, according to Madden, appears to be much larger since he also runs the KPA Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau which includes the XI Storm Corps as well as light infantry units deployed to KPA corps units that are seconded to special missions for the Reconnaissance General Bureau, North Korea's main spy agency.
Several of the areas General Bok is reportedly interested in learning about are drone technology and infantry tactics and how the two are affecting the war. These lessons would be invaluable to Pyongyang in North Korean planning and influence DPRK military reform in the context of conducting future military operations against South Korea and allow the North Korean military to become more suitable for fighting a modern war on the Korean peninsula.
Equally important are the lessons South Korea may derive from the North Korean deployment and the Russia-Ukraine battlelab experience. During the October 20, 2024, press conference at the Pentagon with U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, South Korean Defense Minister Kim Yong-Hyun pointed out that Seoul had dispatched a lessons team to Ukraine to begin studying the role of North Korean forces deployed to the theater of the conflict and would assess lessons-learned from the Ukraine war. Hyun noted in great detail as to why South Korea should learn military lessons from the war in Ukraine, stating that:
“The role of such observers or analysis teams play in the war is mainly analysis of the trends of modern warfare or different aspects of modern welfare. And especially as we have confirmed North Korean troops were deployed to Russia, I believe it could serve as a great opportunity for our analysis team or observer to learn the movements or trends of the North Korean troops. In many wars there — we have witnessed many new and diverse weapon systems continuously popping up and also we were able to witness many different modern tactics in the war. I believe if we can collect such information diligently and then utilize it for our future safety of — and stability of our country, I believe it can serve as an opportunity for us to provide better protection to our — the people of the Republic of Korea.”
Conclusion
Russian President Vladimir Putin has certainly crossed the Rubicon and is having his Yalu moment, utilizing the presence of 10,000 North Koreans to galvanize his sagging war effort against Ukraine. Likewise, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is also enjoying the luxury of basking in the glow of international attention as well..
Moving beyond the headlines, the North Korean deployment has important strategic implications as the influx of North Korean manpower into the conflict could tilt the military balance against Ukraine. So far this has not happened. The arrival of North Korean forces also poses problems as well for Moscow as the Kremlin searches for ways to integrate North Korean units into the Russian command and control structure. This may actually create more problems than solutions to Putin’s gamble to use North Koreans in the war. Both Putin and Kim have nothing to lose at this stage of the conflict as the Russian leader’s war of attrition against Ukraine grinds on amidst North Korea’s willingness to absorb casualities and losses.
A far larger foreseen unknown about the North Korean deployment is what key lessons learned from the conflict the DPRK may derive from their Ukraine battlelab experience and how Pyongyang might apply this knowledge to future military operations on the Korean peninsula. Both North and South Korea will be taking the insights gained from the Ukraine war back to their respective militaries while officials in NATO debate the implications of Kim’s Ukraine venture. The one thing that is perfectly clear is that North Korea’s military involvement in the Ukraine war demonstrates how the interconnectivity of Asia and Europe is affecting world geopolitics as the United States and its NATO allies awaken to the threat of North Korean forces appearing on Europe’s doorstep.
Glen: Fascinating report! Sandy