Russia’s Return to Ochamchire and Its Implications for Black Sea Security
On October 4, after meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin the unrecognized leader of Abkhazia Aslan Bzhania announced in an interview with the Russian newspaper Izvestiya that Moscow plans to create a new permanent naval base in Ochamchire in the Russian-occupied Black Sea province of Georgia. Ochamchire is a former Soviet naval base - created and developed - by the USSR in the late 1980s that was abandoned by the Russian Federation after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991.
With the October 4 announcement, the former Black Sea naval base was once again back in the headlines, setting off a brief discussion in global media outlets but later disappeared. The purpose of this article is to dive deeper into what likely motivated the Kremlin to revive its plans to reopen the naval base at Ochamchire and examine how this development may alter the strategic situation in the southeastern sector of the Black Sea.
Source: BBC map of Russia's new Black Sea naval base at Ochamchire
To date, the naval dimensions of the Russia-Ukraine war have been confined to three quadrants in the Black Sea: the northwestern sector near Odesa, the southwestern sector (May 24 Ukrainian USV attack on the Ivan Kurs reconnaissance ship near the Turkish coast), the central sector that includes the main Russian Black Sea naval base at Sevastopol, and the northeastern part of the Black Sea at Novorossiysk, home to Russia’s second largest naval base in the region. Consequently, the southeastern sector of the Black Sea along the coast of Georgia, Turkey, and Abkhazia has experienced little or no Russian military activity since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
On October 24, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy put Moscow on notice about its decision to reopen the base at Ochamchire by stating that Ukraine would strike the Russian fleet if it were to be based in Abkhazia. The Ukrainian President emphasized that a major naval transition was occurring in the Black Sea with this development by pointing out that the Russian military fleet is no longer able to operate in the western part of the Black Sea and is gradually retreating from Crimea, noting that: "Recently, the Russian leadership was forced to announce the creation of a new base for the Black Sea Fleet – or what's left of it – on the occupied territory of Georgia, in the southeastern part of the sea, as far as possible from Ukrainian missiles and naval drones. But we will reach them everywhere."
Moscow’s Changing Strategic Environment
Russia’s decision to open a new base in occupied Abkhazia comes at the height of President Putin’s soon-to-be three-year war in Ukraine. Russian naval forces in Crimea repeatedly are being hit by Ukrainian aerial and drone attacks as well as cruise missile attacks that are forcing Moscow to reposition naval assets from Crimea to Novorossiysk. According to the most recent UK Ministry of Defense assessment following a strike on the Zaliv shipyards in eastern Crimea (near the Kerch Straits bridge) on November 4, this strike and others are forcing the Kremlin to relocate Russian naval forces further away from the frontlines of the expanding war in the Black Sea.
To date, the bulk of fighting and hostilities from the Russo-Ukraine war have been limited to the northern part of the Black Sea. The Russian announcement about reopening a base in Ochamchire promises to alter the naval dimension to the Russia-Ukraine as Ukrainian air/sea drone and missile attacks have touched 3 of the 4 corners of the Black Sea and could spread to a fourth if Moscow actually proceeds with its plans to reopen its former Soviet naval base in occupied Abkhazia.
Overhead View of Ochamchire Taken in 2021
Russian plans to open a new base at Ochamchire is not something new. In fact, it is the second time in a decade that the Kremlin announced plans to reopen the former naval base. Ochamchire was discontinued as a naval base after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, shortly after the Russian 2008 invasion of Georgia Moscow announced it was returning to its former naval base. Nothing significant, however, came out of this announcement as the plans were discarded and Ochamchire since then has emerged as a major smuggling portal for Ukrainian coal taken from Russisan-occupied Donbas to Turkey which allows Moscow to avoid Western sanctions.
The Russian Threat to Anaklia
By far the country most alarmed about the Russian basing announcement was neighboring Georgia. Ochamchire is only 35 kilometers north of Georgia’s future deep-water port of Anaklia and also close to the Georgian port of Poti, the largest port and logistical infrastructure center that handles 80 percent of country’s container traffic.
The head of Georgia’s State Security Service Grigol Liluashvili initially tried to downplay the announcement about Ochamchire, noting that the former Soviet base is underdeveloped and would require immense resources to become operational again as a naval base. At the same time, however, he also pointed out that Russian forces in Abkhazia pose a threat to the planned port. According to Radio Liberty’s Georgian service on 20 October, Liluashvili noted: “A few kilometers from the port of Anaklia, the Russian regular army is standing with several thousand armed soldiers, with heavy equipment. The fact that this is a threat to Georgia, it was, is, and if the issue of occupation continues like this, there will be a threat to Georgia, including the port of Anaklia."
The Russian menace to Anaklia is an important strategic consideration for the Georgian government due to its recent decision to develop its on-again-off-again deep-water port project at Anaklia. Moscow retains a robust military presence in Georgia’s occupied regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia where its military forces total approximately 5,000 men. Directly north of Anaklia in nearby Abkhazia Moscow operates the 7th Russian military base at Gudauta. Ochamchire port is also part of the 7th which comprises no fewer than 17 military facilities inside Abkhazia.
While Moscow has been transferring men and equipment from these bases and adjusting its military presence in Georgia’s occupied regions, Recently there have been vigorous signs of Russian military activity to expand and deepen its military presence in Abkhazia. On November 3, Radio Free Europe’s Georgian service Radio Tavisupleba published an in-depth report on Russian military improvements inside Abkhazia entitled: “Russian military infrastructure in the occupied territories of Georgia - Where, How Much, for What?”
The report detailed ongoing military infrastructure developments inside Abkhazia as well as Ochamchire port which indicates that Russian plans for developing the former Soviet naval base are in fact quite serious and part of a broader initiative by the Kremlin to enhance its military presence in the occupied Georgian province.
Transportation Routes for Anaklia Deep Sea Port in Georgia.
A Georgian Rotterdam?
Georgian plans to develop Anaklia have caused serious consternation in Moscow for more than a decade motivated by Russian concern that the Georgian deep water port could become another Rotterdam. On February 20, 2023, the Georgian government issued a new tender to develop Anaklia inviting foreign companies to bid on developing the port.
The Anaklia project was first initiated by the staunchly pro-US Georgian leader Mikhail Saakashvili before he was ousted from power by the Russian-leaning Georgia Dream political party in 2012. Led by Russian-made billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, the Georgian government has repeatedly postponed the Anaklia project due to Russian misgivings. The $2.5 billion port project offers immense strategic opportunities to Georgia and the European Union and will draw investment and job opportunities to the region. It would also be a magnet for employment regionally by lessening Russian influence in the undeveloped economy of neighboring Abkhazia. Anaklia offers immense potential to become a major Black Sea logistical hub capable of propelling Georgia into an even larger artery of East-West trade.
Tbilisi’s renewed interest in reviving Anaklia appears to be traced back to China’s renewed interest in the port development project. In August Beijing signed a new strategic partnership agreement with Georgia and developing Anaklia is a key part of this agreement. The port development project is something that Beijing has expressed an interest in developing due to its Belt and Road Initiative to expand trade and economic relations between China and Inner Asia with trade ties to the European Union being an important goal for Beijing in its plans to create a Black Sea trade corridor to the Balkans. Chinese ambassador to Georgia, Zhou Qian, confirmed this view earlier this year by making a rare public declaration regarding Beijing’s interest in the development of the deep-water port of Anaklia. Zhou made it abundantly clear that China considers the port a “critical component” of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Regardless of whether it is Chinese or European companies developing the Anaklia project, officials in Moscow retain an entrenched zero-sum thinking about the port fearing what the strategic port infrastructure might offer to the United States or NATO. While Georgia’s membership in NATO is no longer a high priority for the United States or even NATO, the issue may one day resurface again and that is enough for Moscow to seek ways to derail the Anaklia project.
US M-1 Abrams Tanks Being Unloaded in Batumi Georgia as Part of the 2016 Noble Partner Exercises
Prominent American military thinkers have championed the strategic importance of developing Anaklia. Former Commanding General of US Army Europe Ben Hodges believes the US should invest in the military infrastructure in Georgia as part of a wider effort to invite Georgia into NATO and that Anaklia’s development would significantly enhance NATO and US mobility and reinforcement capabilities into the South Caucasus in the event of another conflict between Russia and Georgia, similar to the 2008 war. Hodges has repeatedly emphasized the military logistical features offered by the Georgian port to NATO, describing it as one of the future pillars of US strategy in the Black Sea region. While serving as Commanding General US Army Europe Hodges spearheaded the transport of US Abrams tanks to Georgia from Bulgaria via the Georgian port of Batumi as part of the 2016 Noble Partner military exercise.
Ukraine’s Asymmetric War in the Black Sea
A key concern fueling Moscow’s motivation to return to Ochamchire is the changing naval environment in the Black Sea. Ukraine is increasingly winning the naval war in the Black Sea by using its asymmetrical combination of Uncrewed Surface Vehicles (USVs), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and the UK-supplied Storm Shadow cruise missiles that have enabled Kyiv to push back the front lines in the Black Sea to at least 100 nautical miles from the Ukrainian shoreline. Kyiv has used this array of weaponry to introduce its own sea denial capability to restrain Moscow in the northwest quadrant of the Black Sea. This in turn has been sufficient enough to create breathing space for Ukraine to begin exporting grain from its Black Sea port of Odesa.
Ukraine’s campaign of multi-domain warfare took a major turn on October 14 when it launched a Storm Shadow cruise missile strike on a Sevastopol shipyard that destroyed the Russian landing ship the Minsk and an $800 million Kilo-class submarine. This attack was preceded by a Storm Shadow missile strike on the Russian Black Sea Fleet headquarters in Sevastopol, the month before. Ukraine displayed its growing strategic reach by striking the Zaliv shipyards on November 6 at Kerch which is located on the far eastern side of Crimea near the Kerch Straits bridge. On this occasion, Ukraine used the French-made SCALP cruise missiles to seriously damage a brand-new Russian warship before it had even been put to sea.
One of the interesting developments regarding Ukraine’s recent waves of air and sea drone attacks on Russian naval bases and port infrastructure in Crimea is Kyiv’s ability to strike deeper and deeper into the Russian-occupied peninsula. This could be attributed to diminishing Russian air defense assets being eliminated in Crimea by repeated Ukrainian attacks.
Russia has a limited number of S-400 air defense units (7-8) based in Crimea and a series of successful strikes like the Cape Tarkhankut attack in late August could be seriously affecting Russian capabilities. These attacks appear to have prompted the Russian navy to rethink its Black Sea basing strategy by relocating key elements of its surface and submarine forces (4 Kilo-class submarines) from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk to guarantee their safety.
Picture of Novorossiysk: The Russian naval base is estimated to have a total of 45 berths available for Russian warships and is now operating at maximum capacity.
Russia’s Pier Shortage at Novorossiysk
In recent weeks reports have surfaced that the Russian navy’s room for maneuvering in the Black Sea is shrinking due to the redeployment of Russian surface naval vessels from Crimea to Novorossiysk. This in turn is creating a basing dilemma for the Kremlin as the number of available piers in the ice-free confines of Tsemes Bay at its second-largest Black Sea naval base is diminishing. Novorossiysk was first created in 1920 by the Bolsheviks to support its naval operations against the Crimea-based White Guard army of General Wrangel.
The Novorossiysk naval base began a massive period of modernization and expansion in 2005 as part of the Russian State Program for development from 2005-2020, due in part to Russian concerns Moscow might lose access to Sevastopol because of the uncertainty of dealing with Kyiv over future access to its Black Sea naval base. On paper, there are supposed to be 100 berths for warships from 1,500 tons to 30,000 tons at the base. In reality, however, there are only 45 berths available at Novorossiysk according to retired Ukrainian admiral Ihor Kabanenko.
Russian Landing Ship Olegegorsky Gornyak
Due to the growing shortage of pier space at Novorossiysk, a Ukrainian USV successfully attacked an unsuspecting Russian Ropucha Class Landing Ship Olenegorsky Gornyak on August 4, which was anchored outside - not inside - the protective security of the harbor. Two important conclusions can be made from this attack; The first was that the Ukrainian strike was 1,000 kilometers from the nearest Ukrainian naval base at Odesa which marked a new range for Ukrainian USV attacks. Russian military planners also mistakenly believed that Novorossiysk was somehow beyond the range of Kyiv’s USV capabilities and failed to take this into consideration when anchoring the warship outside the Russian naval base.
Second, shortly after the attack Ukraine announced it had developed a new long-range undersea drone and likely deployed the USV in the August 4 attack to demonstrate its newfound capabilities. The new Marichka USV, the fourth class of USV introduced by Ukraine in the war, reportedly carries 450kg (992lb) of TNT which is an extremely large amount of explosive. The attack created such severe damage to the landing ship that it reportedly caused its hull to be torn apart and be placed in a Novorossiysk dry dock for repair.
Third, with the addition of the Marichka, Kyiv has its disposal a 1000-kilometer range USV that is more than capable of striking the Russian naval base at Ochamchire.
Ukraine’s first video of the Marichka 1,000 km long-range USV released on September 24 - a full month after the attack on the Olenegorsky Gornyak
Outlook
While Russia is a long way from leaving Crimea, the recent series of naval setbacks in recent months appear to be forcing Russian naval planners to make adjustments in their naval basing strategy in the Black Sea by giving serious consideration to relocating Russian warships to Ochamchire.
Experts on the Russian navy believe that reopening the naval base at Ochamchire would not require tremendous investments by Moscow due to the modifications made during the days of the USSR. According to retired Ukrainian Admiral Ihor Kabanenko, Ochamchire would be easy to defend because the harbor there has a narrow entrance and could thwart potential Ukrainian sea drone attacks. In addition, Ochamchire already has some existing repair facilities and warehouses located at the base that could offer repairs and supply a small number of warships operating from the facility. Perhaps more importantly it is located next to a Russian railhead that allows easy resupply efforts from bases in neighboring Russia.
Kabanenko noted that one of the previous liabilities for Moscow is that Ochamchire was not suitable for larger warships due to its shallow harbor which used to be 3-4 meters deep. In the 1980s, however, Moscow invested significant resources in upgrading the harbor and deepened the port to 9 meters deep making it suitable for larger warships.
Consequently, Ochamchire is more than suitable to host several Russian corvettes but is not able to host anything larger than a Russian frigate like the Admiral Makarov. Ochamchire could easily handle the Karakurt Project 22800 Class, Buyan corvettes of the Project 21631 class as well as patrol ships of the Bykov Project 22160 class. Due to overcrowding in Novorossiysk, the relocation of several of these warships to the harbor of Ochamchire from Crimea or Novorossiysk would help Moscow free up berths to accommodate Russian warships for this particular class.
The Buykov and Buyun class vessels are the same class of warships that were deployed to the Caspian Sea using the Volga-Don canal in 2015 that fired 26 Kalibr missiles to strike Syria that were part of the so-called ‘Putin birthday flotilla’. By utilizing the port at Ochamchire Moscow could still dispatch a group of corvettes from the Black Sea port to periodically strike Ukrainian territory using the long-range Kalibr missiles and then return to the safety of the naval base which is a key factor for Kyiv to consider when assessing the Russian naval base in Abkhazia.
As Ukrainian attacks on Crimea and Novorossiysk intensify, Moscow is keen to preserve the combat resilience of these warships given that the Bosporus is closed to Russian transfers of any additional warships to the Black Sea due to the Montreux Convention. Because of this, the Kremlin cannot bring in additional assets from other fleets to recoup its naval losses in the Black Sea since the war began in 2022 - including the lost flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet - the Moskva.
In conclusion, Zelenskyy’s quick reaction to the Russian announcement to reopen Ochamchire on October 24 is a clear indicator that Ukraine would not hesitate to strike Russian naval assets in Abkhazia. In such an event this could cause the Russia-Ukraine war to spill over into the South Caucasus and create a new set of concerns by the West to limit the impact of the war. Zelenskyy’s announcement clearly indicates Ukraine’s growing level of confidence in its maritime drone fleet as the Ukrainian leadership is determined to expand its sea denial operations to a new sector of the Black Sea.